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study how decision-making changes if depositors are able to make their
decision to keep their funds in the bank visible to subsequent deposi-
tors at a cost. We show theoretically in a Diamond-Dybvig setup that
without this signaling option multiple equilibria are possible, while
signaling makes the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test
if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We nd that
indeed when signaling is available, bank runs are less likely to arise
and signaling is extensively used.
JEL classication numbers: C72, C91, D80, G21
Keywords: Bank runs, Asymmetric information, Experimental evidence,
Signaling
1 Introduction
The run on Northern Rock, an English bank, heralded the onset of the nan-
cial crisis during which episodes of banks and other nancial institutions suf-
fering sudden and massive withdrawals of deposits and other funding sources
were frequent (e.g. the investment bank Bear Stearns in the US, the DSB
Bank in the Netherlands or Bankia in Spain). Deteriorating fundamentals
are a prime cause of bank runs, but there was often also a substantial self-
fullling component to the behavior of depositors. Depositors may just hurry
to withdraw fearing that other depositors will do so and if they go late no
funds may be left in the bank. This fear is illustrated vividly by the words of
Anne Burke, a client of Northern Rock, who said the following while queuing
up to withdraw her funds: Its not that I disbelieve Northern Rock, but
everyone is worried and I dont want to be the last one in the queue. If
everyone else does it, it becomes the right thing to do.1 The above quote
shows that depositors react to other depositorsobserved decisions. Empiri-
cal studies (Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; and Iyer and
1See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeypCkzcRlU4
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Puri, 2012) and experimental ndings (Garratt and Keister, 2009; Kiss et al.
2012) support this idea as well.
Depositorsdecision may be seen as a coordination game in which ob-
serving other depositorsdecisions is important. Therefore, it is relevant to
know what can be observed? In the seminal paper by Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983) it is assumed that depositors play a simultaneous-move game, so
no decision can be observed. This setup yields two symmetric equilibria: i)
bank run, when everybody rushes to withdraw from the bank, ii) no bank
run, when only those withdraw who need liquidity. This model applies well
to some cases in reality, when observability of other depositorsactions is
almost non-existent. It was the case during the silent run on Washington
Mutual in 2008, when depositors withdrew their funds electronically.2 Other
empirical observations suggest however, that both withdrawal and the deci-
sion to keep the money deposited are observable. Kelly and O Grada (2000)
and Iyer and Puri (2012) point at the importance of observing decisions of
both sorts in ones social network. In Starr and Yilmaz (2007), small and
medium-sized depositors observe only withdrawals of their peers during a
bank run incident in 2001 in Turkey, but the behavior of large depositors
appears to be driven by observing both choices. However, these empirical
studies suggest that observing that somebody has decided to keep her funds
in the bank is restricted to ones social network or a limited set of depositors,
while withdrawals are more broadly observed. When seeing the queues in
front of the bank we know that the people in the queue decided to withdraw.
But we do not know if those who are not in the line have decided to keep
the money in the bank or have not decided yet (and potentially will decide
to withdraw). Hence, there seems to be an asymmetry in the observability
of depositorsdecision, withdrawal being more visible.
Is the previous asymmetry important? Empirical papers and experimen-
2When nothing is observed, Arifovic et al. (2013) show experimentally that bank runs
are more likely the more stringent are the conditions for the coordination of depositors.
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tal studies suggest that the answer is positive. Kelly and O Grada (2000)
nd that the county of origin is the prime determinant of the depositors
decision and it is due to the fact that people coming from the same county
tended to live in the same neighborhood. In some neighborhood deposi-
tors ran, while in others they did not. Hence, observing withdrawals makes
bank runs more likely, while if depositors observe that others have kept their
money deposited, then they are more likely to follow suit. Kiss et al. (2014)
nd experimentally that - compared to observing nothing - observing a with-
drawal (keeping the money deposited) increases (decreases) the likelihood of
withdrawal. These results suggests that if depositors could make visible their
choice to keep their funds deposited, then bank runs would be less likely to
occur. We study theoretically and experimentally if this conjecture is correct.
We claim that bank runs in the Diamond-Dybvig model may be prevented
by enhancing the observability of depositorsactions, especially if the deci-
sion to keep the money deposited is made visible. Following Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), bank-run models generally use a simultaneous-move frame-
work, implying that depositors do not observe any decisions. Nevertheless,
banks are able to observe to some extent depositorsdecisions. Peck and Shell
(2003) claim that the most natural assumption is that only withdrawals are
observed by the bank, since depositors do not go to the bank to tell that
they do not want to withdraw. Green and Lin (2000, 2003) assume that each
depositor contacts the bank and communicates her decision of withdrawal or
keeping the money deposited. We combine these two views and suppose that
withdrawals are observable, whereas keeping the money deposited is not.3
However, assume that holdings can be made observable, at a cost. Thus, a
depositor who decides to hold can send a signal to the bank that reveals her
decision. Important for our purpose, the bank upon observing the decision
of a depositor communicates it to those who have not decided yet.
In our model, depositors decide in a consecutive way according to an ex-
3We use "keeping the money deposited" and "holding" in an interchangeable manner.
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ogenously given sequence of decisions.4 Each depositor can either withdraw,
hold and signal or hold without signaling. Sending the signal is costly, but a
signal of holding may induce subsequent patient depositors to hold as well.
We show that as the game unfolds, for any patient depositor signaling strictly
dominates withdrawal. As a consequence, patient depositors know that no
other patient depositor would withdraw given the information sets that may
arise, so they choose to hold without signaling. Therefore, the unconstrained-
e¢ cient allocation is implemented without costs. The intuition behind the
result is that signaling is needed to make withdrawal a strictly dominated
action, but once it is strictly dominated signaling becomes strictly dominated
as well.
Our assumption about signaling the decision of holding ts into the ex-
isting literature of bank runs, as explained before. Signaling - as seen in this
paper - is not a standard practice in nancial intermediation. However, with
recent technological advances it may not just be a theoretical instrument but
a practical one in the future. Signaling can also be seen as a metaphor of
intense communication between the bank and its depositors.
We test the theoretical results experimentally as well in the lab. We nd
suggestive evidence of a treatment e¤ect. Notably, the probability of bank
runs is considerably lower in the treatment given all possible sequences of
decisions. Individual decisions reveal only moderate di¤erences at the co-
inciding di¤erent information sets. However, participants in the treatment
with signaling use extensively the costly signals and it leads to a decrease of
withdrawals and , as a consequence, of bank runs. Hence, the experiment
conrms that there is a di¤erence in terms of withdrawals between treatments
as predicted by theory. However, contrary to the theoretical prediction sig-
naling is often observed.
4This assumption is usual in the literature. See Green and Lin (2000, 2003), Andolfatto
et al. (2007) or Ennis and Keister (2009b).
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1.1 Related literature
Most theoretical papers assume that depositors make the decision about
withdrawal of funds simultaneously (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; En-
nis and Keister, 2009). Ennis and Keister (2015) study a setup that features
aggregate uncertainty regarding the type of depositors. The bank and depos-
itors observe withdrawals as they occur and they show that bank runs may
arise in such an environment..Kinateder and Kiss (2014) who suppose that
depositors decide after each other according to a predetermined order (line)
and they observe all previous choices before making decision. They study
two setups: when, besides actions, liquidity needs of previous depositors are
also observed, and when only the previous actions are observed and liquidity
needs are private information. In both cases, they obtain that bank runs do
not occur in equilibrium.
Related to our idea, we are aware of two papers that eliminate bank runs
through enriching the set of actions and the information in the underlying
game. Cavalcanti and Monteiro (2015) and Andolfatto et al. (2014) have
models with aggregate uncertainty about types. The idea behind Cavalcanti
and Monteiro (2015) is that patient depositors who withdraw do not mind to
reveal that they lied once they received their money and if they reveal it then
the bank can always use the correct conditional distributions to assign pay-
ments to the subsequent depositors. The fact that the bank is able to adjust
payments quickly leads to the elimination of the run strategy. Andolfatto et
al. (2014) augments the announcement space and depositors can announce
also if they believe that a bank run is underway. Under threat of suspension
conditional on the communication run equilibria are eliminated. Our paper
is connected to these papers as we also assume that the canonical choice set
of waiting and withdrawal is augmented with the possibility of waiting and
making it public at a cost. However, there are noticeable di¤erences. While
elimination of the bank run equilibrium in the other papers is based on the
banks ability to detect quickly that a bank run is on, our result builds on
6
observability and the bank does not need to adjust payments. This di¤erence
is due to large extent to the existence of aggregate uncertainty about liquid-
ity types in Cavalcanti and Monteiro (2015) and Andolfatto et al. (2014),
because there the question is whether the bank is able to recognize in time
that there is a bank run and the large number of withdrawals is not due to a
liquidity shock. In contrast, in our classic Diamond-Dybvig setup there is no
such aggregate uncertainty and bank runs arise if patient depositors believe
that many other patient depositors will withdraw. By making observability
of non-withdrawal possible, we may eliminate such beliefs and remove bank
run equilibrium.
In experiments investigating bank runs, mainly simultaneous decisions
have been considered to study the problem of coordination among depos-
itors (e.g., Arifovic, Jiang and Xu, 2013) or analyze if bank runs can be
contagious (Brown, Trautmann and Vlahu, 2012). There are only few exper-
iments that allow for the observability of previous decisions.5 Schotter and
Yorulmazer (2009) claim that sequentiality is an important element in bank
runs. In their experiment they use simultaneous and sequential treatments,
being the rst to compare outcomes when the degree of observability di¤ers.
They study how di¤erent factors (e.g. asymmetric information, deposit in-
surance) a¤ect the speed of withdrawals.6 Theoretically, subjectsbehavior
should not depend on the form of the game, but Schotter and Yorulmazer
(2009) show that the available information (e.g. about past decisions) a¤ects
the subjectschoices. In contrast to their results, we obtain our ndings in
an environment without uncertainty about the fundamentals of the bank.7
5In Brown, Trautmann and Vlahu (2012) depositors of the same bank decide simulta-
neously, but depositors may observe the decisions of depositors of other banks.
6Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2012a) and Madies (2006) also investigate the
e¢ ciency of deposit insurance to curb bank runs by means of laboratory experiments.
7In Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) uncertainty involves the fundamentals of the bank,
since banks have di¤erent quality that is generally unobservable to depositors. Chari
and Jagganathan (1988) show theoretically how a heightened withdrawal demand may be
perceived incorrectly as a signal that the banks quality is poor.
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Garratt and Keister (2009) introduce two novel elements: in some treatments
subjects were given up to three opportunities of withdrawal and sometimes
faced forced withdrawals. In the treatment with multiple opportunities to
withdraw subjects were informed about the total number of withdrawals in
their bank after each opportunity. Forced withdrawals occurred with some
probability as some subjects were forced to withdraw; and the other subjects
observed these forced withdrawals. Garratt and Keister (2009) show that
uncertain withdrawal demand when subjects have multiple opportunities to
withdraw result in frequent bank runs. Interestingly, these factors alone do
not lead to a large number of bank runs. They claim that more informa-
tion about other depositorsdecisions may be harmful for coordination when
there are still opportunities to withdraw. We note that none of these papers
considers the asymmetry of available information.
At the heart of the paper lies the assumption that a patient depositor is
able to reveal in a credible way that she will keep her funds deposited. The
closest mechanism in real life is to commit not to withdraw the funds by
having a time deposit instead of a sight deposit. Niinimaki (2002) proposes
a model that has time deposits and is able to prevent bank runs. However,
there observability does not play any role.
Making visible that people keep their money deposited was also present in
banking panic episodes. Bruner and Carr (2008) describe how JPMorgan and
his associates tried to deal with the 1907 panic in New York. A centerpiece of
their action was to reassure the public that there was no need to panick. Each
possible clergyman, priest and rabbi was visited by the associates and asked
to make comforting statements to their congregations We may interpret
this e¤ort as a way to make visible that a leader of the community will not
withdraw and potentially those who hear the sermons will follow suit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and
denes the model. In section 3, we derive the theoretical results. Section
4 lays out the experimental procedure and presents the ndings. Section 5
8
concludes.
2 The model
There are two time periods denoted by t = 1; 2; and a nite set of depositors
denoted by I = f1; :::; Ng; where N > 2: The consumption of depositor i 2 I
in period t = 1; 2 is denoted by ct;i 2 R0+: Her liquidity type is denoted by
i and belongs to the set of liquidity types  = f1; 2g: If i = 1; depositor
i is called impatient, that is, she only cares about consumption at t = 1: If
i = 2; depositor i is called patient. Given i 2 f1; 2g; each depositor is
utility function is given by
ui(c1;i; c2;i; i) = ui(c1;i + (i   1)c2;i):
It is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
di¤erentiable and to satisfy the Inada conditions. The relative risk-aversion
coe¢ cient,  ciu00i (ci)=u0i(ci); is assumed to be strictly larger than 1, for all
ci 2 R+; and all i 2 I:
Each depositor has one unit of a homogeneous good deposited in the
bank. The bank has access to a constant-return-to-scale productive technol-
ogy which pays a gross return of one unit for each endowment liquidated at
t = 1; and a xed return of R > 1 for each endowment liquidated at t = 2:8
It o¤ers a simple demand deposit contract which pays c1 to any depositor i
who withdraws at t = 1; as long as the bank has funds left, and the same
pro rata share of funds available to all depositors who wait until t = 2:
The number of patient depositors is assumed to be constant and given
by p 2 f1; :::; Ng and the remaining depositors are impatient. The number
of patient and impatient depositors is common knowledge. However, each
depositors type is only realized at t = 1:
8We follow the literature (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Green and Lin, 2003; Ennis and
Keister, 2009a and 2014) assuming there is no fundamental uncertainty about the return.
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Let N = f1; 2gN ; and N = (1; :::; N) denote the sequence of depos-
itors, also called (liquidity) type vector. The set of sequences of length N
with p patient depositors is given by
N;p = fN 2 N :
NP
i=1
(i   1) = pg:
There are
 
N
p

possible type vectors. At t = 1; one is selected randomly by
a process which selects each of them with equal probability. Under imperfect
information, the realized liquidity type vector is unobserved both by the
depositors and the bank.
Next, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation is derived. A social planner could
maximize the sum of depositorsutilities (which are assumed to be identical,
except of the liquidity type) with respect to c1;i and c2;i subject to a resource
constraint and to the commonly known number of patient and impatient
depositors, p and N   p; respectively. The rst best allocation solves
maxc1;i;c2;i(N   p)ui(c1;i) + pui(c2;i)
s. t. (N   p)c1;i + pRc2;i = N:
The solution to this problem is
u0(c1) = Ru
0(c2);
which, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), implies that R > c2 > c

1 > 1:
In the rst best allocation, all impatient depositors consume c1 at t = 1;
and all patient ones c2 at t = 2: Hence, patient depositors receive a higher
consumption than impatient ones.
2.1 Strategies and equilibrium concept
A sequential service constraint is assumed to hold, that is, at t = 1; the
depositors contact the bank sequentially in the order given by N ; and the
10
payment to any withdrawing depositor only depends on the history, but not
on the decisions of subsequent depositors, as will be specied below.
Once it is depositor is turn to decide, she decides whether to wait or
withdraw, that is, she chooses an element in  such that 1 implies withdraw
and 2 wait. Moreover, she decides whether to send a costly signal that pub-
licly reveals her decision or not. Denote the signal space by   fsg; nsgg,
that is, a depositor decides whether to send a signal, denoted by sg, or not,
denoted by nsg. Let N = fsg; nsggN :
Since withdrawals are publicly observable by all other depositors as well
as the bank, it will be a strictly dominated strategy for depositor i to choose
sg in case she withdraws since this is costly for her. For a depositor who
decides to wait, however, the equilibrium analysis will determine whether
this is true as well.
Depositor is strategy is then dened as si 2   , though, for the
reason just mentioned, si will always be an element in f1; 2sg; 2nsgg; that
is, she announces a type from  and if she waits whether to costly signal
this or not. When type 1 or 2 is announced, she wishes to consume at t = 1
(i.e., withdraw) or at t = 2 (i.e., wait), respectively; and when sg or nsg is
announced, she sends a costly signal publicly revealing her decision or not,
respectively.
The bank and each depositor i are assumed to observe withdrawals and
signals perfectly. When it is depositor is turn to decide, she observes the
history of all withdrawals and signals sent by waiting depositors: let hti denote
the history observed by depositor i that contains t observations of signals and
withdrawals.9
Anonymity is assumed, that is, depositor is index does not reveal any
information about her position in the queue. However, observing hti; i knows
that her position in the queue N is at least t, though she could be at a later
9Note that to wait and signal withdrawal or to withdraw and signal wait is immediately
identied as erroneous by the other depositors, and thus, we do not consider this kind of
strategic behavior.
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position if some depositor before her decided to wait, but not to signal this.
Depositor is strategy is conditional on the history she observed and her
type. Given this, and following Ennis and Keister (2014), it is formally
dened as si : N  N !  :10
Slightly abusing notation, let S = f1; 2sg; 2nsggN be the games strategy
space, and let s 2 S be a strategy prole, that is, s = (s1; :::; sN): In order to
emphasize depositor is strategy, s is sometimes written as (si; s i):
Given strategy prole s 2 S; depositor is consumption is specied by
ci = (c1;i; c2;i); where c1;i : i ! R0+; and c2;i : N ! R0+: The consumption
of all depositors is feasible if
PN
i=1(c1;i +
c2;i
R
)  N: Depositor is period-1
consumption is then dened as
c1;i =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
c1; if si = 1 and N  
i 1P
j=1
(2  sj)c1  c1;
y; if si = 1 and 0 < N  
i 1P
j=1
(2  sj)c1 < c1;
0; otherwise,
where y = N Pi 1j=1(2 sj)c1 : until the bank runs out of funds, any depositor
who announces to be impatient receives a positive consumption c1 or y:
Let  2 f0; :::; pg be the number of depositors who wait at t = 1; that
is, each of them announces to be of type 2.11 Given  = 1
2
PN
i=1 si  0; all
players who wait at t = 1; obtain the same consumption at t = 2; namely,
c2() = maxf0; R(N (N )c

1)

g:
If  = p; only impatient depositors withdraw at t = 1; and c2() = c2 > c

1:
Then, patient depositors enjoy a higher consumption than impatient ones.
10Given a history of length t; player i takes into account all possible paths in the corre-
sponding extensive form game which yield this history. As will become clear later, there
are histories after which i is for sure at one of the earlier positions in the queue, and others,
after which she is for sure at a later position in the queue.
11Note that  is restricted to be equal to p or smaller since an impatient depositor has
a dominant strategy to withdraw, and thus, not more than p depositors will wait.
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If depositor i chooses to signal that she waits, then she is charged an
additional small cost of  > 0 in terms of her utility such that ui(c2;i)   >
ui(c

1;i): Thus, the strategy prole determines a depositors consumption in
both periods and whether she sends a signal or not. Both in turn determine
her utility: for any i 2 I; and any s 2 S; this is denoted by ui(s): Thus, ui is
a mapping from S to [ ;1): Let the tuple (I;S; u) be the bank run game,
where u = (u1; :::; uN):
Depositor i observes hti, knows her type i and the commonly known
parameters p and N: However, due to imperfect information, she does not
know her position in the queue and neither observes the realized type vector.
Given the available information, she forms beliefs about her position in the
queue and about the type vector that was selected by nature. Let i 
i(
N j hti; i) denote depositor is belief about the type vector. This belief
is conditional on the history and is type and is updated according to Bayes
rule whenever possible. The belief together with a strategy prole denes a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Denition 1. Given a bank run game. Then, strategy prole s 2 S and
belief system  = (1; :::N) are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if,
and only if, for all i 2 I; given i; hti and any ~si 2 f1; 2g;
P
N2N
i(
N j hti; i)ui(s) 
P
N2N
i(
N j hti; i)ui(~si; s i);
where i(
N j hti; i) is consistent with Bayesrule whenever possible.
A strategy prole and belief system are a PBE if, and only if, the strategy is
sequentially rational given the belief for all players and the belief is consistent
with the strategy (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, and Myerson, 1997).
Moreover, there are consistency requirements on the beliefs that arise from
the fact that p andN are commonly known, the history is commonly observed
and an impatient depositors dominant strategy is to withdraw. These are
discussed in more depth below.
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3 Theoretical results
The simple demand deposit contract dened above yields the Pareto e¢ cient
allocation (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Our goal is to show that this
allocation is the unique PBE outcome of the bank run game.
Given p; N and c1; it is possible to determine howmany patient depositors
have to wait in order for waiting to be an optimal strategy for each of them.
In Lemma 1, one part of this threshold is derived,12 namely, the one (denoted
as ) such that c2;i > c1; for every patient depositor i who waits at t = 1: If
some patient depositor declares to be impatient, then the bank spends funds
on her which it would otherwise have kept until t = 2: Recall that  is the
number of patient depositors that wait.
Lemma 1. Given p; N and c1; there is a unique  such that 1    p; and
for every patient depositor i for whom si = 2; c2;i()  c1; for all   ; and
c2;i() > c

1; for all  > :
The proof of Lemma 1 follows as a corollary from Kinateder and Kiss
(2014).
This result also yields the minimum number of withdrawals that need to
be observed in order for withdrawing to be a dominant strategy at t = 1 for
any depositor since more than N   p depositors withdrew already.
3.1 Example
The depositors commonly know p and N; and that nature selects each type
vector with equal probability. Moreover, each depositor knows her own type
and observes the history. This is referred to as available information. Given
the available information, a depositor forms beliefs about the type vector
selected by nature and, by sequential rationality, anticipates how subsequent
12The other part is a technical detail which is derived below in Proposition 1s proof.
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depositors behave. In such an environment of imperfect information, sequen-
tial rationality plays a similar role as backward induction in games of perfect
information (see Myerson, 1997).
Suppose that there are four depositors: one is impatient and the other
three are patient. Before the game begins, nature selects each of the four
possible type vectors with equal probability. Once the type vector is selected,
each depositor observes her type but not any others and neither her position
in the queue. Then, they take decisions in a sequential order. Moreover, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. All three patient depositors have to keep the money in the
bank in order to make waiting worthwhile for all of them.
We take the utility function from Ennis and Keister (2009). For all i; it
is dened as
ui =
c1 1
1  + (i   1)
c1 2
1  :
It fulls the assumptions made in section 1. In particular, let R = 1:25 and
 = 3 be the risk aversion coe¢ cient. The optimal allocation is c1 = 1:116
and c2 = 1:202: Then, it is easy to calculate that after two withdrawals 2.232
of the 4 units deposited in the bank are gone and any remaining depositor is
strictly better o¤ to withdraw the remaining funds of 1.768 at t = 1 rather
than to wait: if two depositors wait, then at t = 2; the total funds left are 2.21
which yields 1:105 < 1:116 for each of them. So any subsequent depositor is
better o¤ to withdraw, and therefore, this example fulls Assumption 1.
Obviously, any impatient depositor i is always strictly better o¤ to with-
draw since i = 1 for her. So any candidate strategy prole which contains
such a case is never a PBE. In all remaining cases, the impatient depositor
withdraws, while the patient depositors withdraw, wait, wait and signal or
choose di¤erent actions. Taking this into account, the following list of strat-
egy proles is a complete description of all possible equilibrium candidate
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strategy proles that can arise given the set of depositors, their types and
strategies as well as that the impatient depositor withdraws:
 Pooling equilibrium candidate: all depositors choose the same action,
that is, withdraw.
 Separating equilibrium candidate: all depositors of one type choose
the same action, and that of the other type another action; that is, the
impatient depositor withdraws, the patient ones either all wait or wait
and signal.
 Any other equilibrium candidate: the impatient depositor withdraws,
there are at least two patient depositors that choose di¤erent actions.
Deriving the PBE Now we will go through the three candidate strategy
proles that are left. Consider rst the separating PBE candidate: inde-
pendently of the realized type vector, on the equilibrium path, all patient
depositors either wait or wait and signal, while the single impatient deposi-
tor withdraws.
It is quite easy to see that to wait and signal for the three patient depos-
itors is no PBE since the last patient depositor in the queue (after observing
two signals of waiting) is strictly better o¤ to save the signal cost and to
wait. So she has a protable deviation and this is no PBE.
We show next that the separating PBE candidate in which the impatient
depositor withdraws and the three patient ones wait is a PBE. Obviously,
the impatient depositors strictly dominant strategy is to withdraw and she
has no protable deviation to wait or to wait and signal.13 Her strategy is
optimal after any history and given any belief. On the equilibrium path, her
belief assigns a probability of 1
4
to each type vector in which she occupies one
of the four positions, that is, the cannot update her belief from the prior.
13Though on an o¤-equilibrium path on which the bank ran out of funds she is indi¤erent
to wait or not since her utility is 0 anyway, and thus, her strategy is not strictly dominant.
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On an o¤-equilibrium path, her belief is derived analogously to the one
of the corresponding patient depositor after observing the history, though
taking into account that she is impatient.
Patient depositors: Consider now a patient depositors complete strategy and
belief system for the four possible positions she can have taking into account
that she only observes the history, but does not know her position in the
queue. Her complete strategy is to wait as long as the history contains at
most one withdrawal and to withdraw otherwise.
Depositor 1: she observes an empty history which is compatible with being
on the equilibrium path. She puts an equal belief on the type vector in
which she is in the rst, second or third position and the impatient depositor
is behind her; if the impatient depositor were before her, then she would have
observed a withdrawal. By sequential rationality, she anticipates that the two
remaining patient depositors will wait or waited already before her and that
the impatient depositor (behind her) will withdraw. She has no protable
deviation from waiting since both withdrawing or waiting and signaling yield
her a lower expected payo¤. Thus, it is optimal for her to wait.
Depositor 2: suppose rst that she observes an empty history. Then, her
reasoning is identical to depositor 1s and her optimal decision is to wait.
Suppose next that she observes a withdrawal. Then, her reasoning is identical
as before with the sole exception that she is now sure that the impatient
depositor is before her in the queue, that is, she believes to occupy position
2, 3 or 4, each with equal probability. Again her optimal decision is to wait
and she has no protable deviation.
Finally, suppose that she observes any other o¤-equilibrium path history.
Given that she is in the second position the only history left that she could ob-
serve is a signal of waiting. Then, while she nds herself on an o¤-equilibrium
path, her reasoning is identical as before and her optimal decision is to wait
given that she didnt observe more than one withdrawal. (Her belief assigns
a probability of 1
3
each to her and the impatient depositor being in positions
17
(2,3), (3,4), (2,4), respectively.)
Depositor 3: the reasoning for her is identical as for depositor 2 if she either
observes the empty history, one withdrawal or one waiting and signal.
Consider now the history in which she observes two withdrawals: then,
her optimal decision is to withdraw and she complies with her strategy (in-
dependently of her belief). To wait or to wait and signal are no protable
deviations in this case. Her belief assigns an equal probability to the cases in
which she is at position 3 and two depositors before her withdrew or she is
the last depositor and depositors 2 and 3 withdrew, while depositor 1 waited.
In any other case, an out o¤ equilibrium path history contains at most
one withdrawal. Therefore, she is better o¤ to wait and has no protable
deviation. Her belief is obtained accordingly.
Depositor 4: on the equilibrium path she observes one withdrawal and applies
an identical reasoning as the other patient depositors in this case. She is
better o¤ to wait rather than to withdraw or to wait and signal. She believes
with equal probability to be in position 2, 3 or 4.
The out o¤ equilibrium behavior is covered by the cases of the other de-
positors. If the history contains two withdrawals, then she is strictly better o¤
to withdraw and if there were three withdrawals, then the bank is bankrupt
already. Otherwise, she is strictly better o¤ to wait forming corresponding
beliefs.
Given this strategy, any depositors decision on the equilibrium path is
optimal and no bank run is a PBE.
On the equilibrium path, any other belief system is not consistent with
the strategy prole and the available information. However, on some o¤-
equilibrium path, while the depositorsstrategies are optimal given the ob-
served history, their belief updating is unconstrained and there are possibly
other consistent beliefs. Hence, there are multiple PBE strategy proles which
di¤er by depositorsbeliefs and strategies o¤the equilibrium path. Yet, given
any consistent belief system, the strategy prole is a PBE and yields no bank
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run as outcome.
Uniqueness of PBE outcome In order to show that there is a unique
PBE outcome, it is left to show that the pooling equilibrium candidate and
any other equilibrium candidate are no PBE.
That the pooling equilibrium candidate in which all three patient depos-
itors withdraw is no PBE follows from the example in Kinateder and Kiss
(2014). Suppose that nature selects a type vector in which a patient depos-
itor is rst in the queue. Then, she observes an empty history and believes
to be the rst depositor in the queue. She has a protable deviation to wait
and signal this. Then, analogously as in Kinateder and Kiss (2014), the other
patient depositors in the queue after observing this signal are better o¤ to
wait on this out of equilibrium path. Hence, there is no bank run and this
strategy prole is no PBE.
Consider next any remaining strategy prole. In this case, the impatient
depositor withdraws and there are at least two patient depositors choosing
di¤erent actions. We will now consider all possible cases.
Suppose that each patient depositor chooses a di¤erent action. Then,
since there overall two withdrawals (one by the impatient and another by
a patient depositor), a bank run occurs for sure. Therefore, there is a type
vector in which each of the two patient depositors that do not withdraw has
a protable deviation to do so and this is no PBE.
Suppose next that some patient depositor is asked to withdraw and some
other to wait. Then, if there is one patient depositor who is asked to with-
draw, she has a protable deviation to wait as well since then there is no
bank run and she receives a higher payo¤. Similarly, if there are two patient
depositors asked to withdraw and one to wait, then the one who is prescribed
to wait has a protable deviation to withdraw in any type vector in which
she is in the one of the rst three positions. Thus, both types of strategy
proles are no PBE.
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Analogously, it follows immediately from the previous argument that any
strategy prole in which some patient depositor is asked to withdraw and
some to wait and signal is no PBE either.
Finally, consider any strategy prole in which some patient depositor is
asked to wait and some other to wait and signal. Then, the one who is
asked to send a signal can save the corresponding cost and wait nevertheless.
Thus, she has a protable deviation and this is no PBE either. In this way,
we considered all possible strategy proles, and after showing that a bank
run is never a PBE outcome, it follows that no bank run is the unique PBE
outcome.
3.2 The general case
The arguments in the previous subsection are generalized in order to nd the
set of PBE for any bank run game and the unique PBE outcome is no bank
run which is the Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
Proposition 1. Given a bank run game, then the Pareto e¢ cient allocation
is the unique PBE outcome.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A. Intuitively, in any
PBE, given the available information, it is consistent for a patient depositor
to believe to be on the equilibrium path as long as there are N   p or less
withdrawals, that is, unless she observes a history which is incompatible with
being on the equilibrium path. Given this belief, it obviously yields her a
higher expected utility to wait. She waits and anticipates, by sequential
rationality, that all other patient depositors behind her will wait as well. For
each of them, an analogous reasoning applies and it is optimal to wait. This
in turn generates a history which induces all other patient depositors to wait,
while all impatient ones withdraw. No bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
However, as in the example above, there are several PBE strategy proles
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and belief systems which all are identical on the equilibrium path, though
they di¤er on o¤-equilibrium paths.
Analogously to the example, given any other strategy prole, there is a
type vector for which some patient depositor has a protable deviation and
by leading the game down an o¤-equilibrium path, all patient depositors are
better o¤ to wait. By doing this, each of them receives a higher payo¤.
3.3 Only withdrawals are observed
In this case, the reasoning of the no bank run equilibrium is identical as
before. Essentially, the games nature is that of a simultaneous move game
for the patient depositors who wait. They would start withdrawing after
observing more withdrawals than there are impatient depositors, but they
all stick to their strategy and are rewarded with a higher consumption at
t = 2; and thus, with a larger payo¤.
However, there is another equilibrium in this case that consists of all de-
positors withdrawing. In this case, it is not possible for the patient depositors
to coordinate on waiting. In any type vector in which a patient depositor
is rst in the queue, by waiting the game reaches an o¤ equilibrium path,
though the other patient depositors do not observe this, and thus, are better
o¤ to withdraw. For them it is observationally equivalent to the equilibrium
path in which all depositors withdraw, and thus, they cannot be all induced
to wait.
Hence, there is a marked di¤erence between the cases when only with-
drawals are observed and when depositors are able to signal at a cost to
subsequent depositors that they chose not to withdraw. Therefore, theoreti-
cally the asymmetry in the observability of depositorsdecision (withdrawals
being more visible) a¤ect the emergence of bank runs. In the next section,
we test if our theoretical nding can be veried in the laboratory.
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4 Experimental design and results
4.1 Procedure
We recruited a total of 66 subjects (31 men and 35 women) with no previous
experience in coordination problems or experiments on nancial decisions.
We ran 2 sessions (both with 33 participants) at the Laboratory for Re-
search in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) of Universidad de Valencia in
October 2015. The participants in the experiment were students from di¤er-
ent programs (???) at the university. The experiment was programmed using
the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read aloud at the
beginning of the experiment and questions were answered privately. The
experiment began once all participants answered correctly three questions
regarding the experiment.
Four depositors formed a bank, each depositor endowed with 80 ECUs.
Three of the depositors were participants in the lab (patient depositors),
while the last one was simulated by the computer (impatient depositor). We
explained that the depositor simulated by the computer always withdrew and
that payo¤s depended on the participants and her co-playersdecisions. We
had two treatments. In the baseline treatment, we allowed participants to
observe only withdrawals, while in the other treatment (signaling treatment)
they had the opportunity to reveal at a cost to subsequent depositors that
they decided to keep their money deposited in the bank.
Important for our research question, in the baseline treatment we pointed
out that position in the line is not known, but participants can observe if
somebody (who had already decided) withdrew her funds from the bank. We
made clear that observations are compatible with several decisions, e.g. not
observing anything may mean that the participant is the rst to decide, but
also that she is the second (or third) and one (or two) other participant(s)
decided to keep the money in the bank. In the signaling treatment, we allowed
participants to reveal at a cost of 10 ECUs to subsequent depositors that they
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keep their funds in the bank. We used examples to explain in this case also
what information the observed decisions reveal. For instance, observing that
a depositor has withdrawn followed by a depositor who signaled to keep her
funds reveals that the participant is either in position 3 or 4.
In both treatments we used the same payo¤s, the only di¤erence being
that if somebody signaled in the signaling treatment, then 10 ECUs were
deducted from her payo¤s. The payo¤s were the following. If a participant
is the rst, second or third to withdraw, then her payo¤ is 100. If she is the
fourth to withdraw, then her payo¤ is 60 ECUs. If a participant holds and
in total three / two / one depositors do so, then her payo¤ is 125 / 70 / 70
ECUs. Note that these payo¤s allow for the coordination problem that lies
at the heart of the paper and was outlined in the theory section.
To maximize the data that we collect we asked the participants in all
possible information setups.14 Therefore, in the baseline treatment we asked
if they wanted to withdraw or to hold after observing zero, one, two or three
withdrawals. In the signaling treatment, we asked if they wanted to with-
draw, to hold or to hold and make it observable after observing nothing; one
/ two / three withdrawal(s); one / two signal(s) that a depositor has de-
cided to hold; and the feasible combinations of these decisions. We explained
that at the end of the experiment we form banks of four (composed by three
participants and the computer) randomly, then we determine randomly the
sequence of decisions (including the computer that withdraws) and take into
account the decision that they had given for the relevant scenario.
At the end of the experiment, the subjects lled out a questionnaire that
was used to collect additional information about demographic and socioe-
conomic variables (sex, age, eld of study, family income, belief in di¤erent
14The procedure that we used is the strategy method. Alternatively, we could have used
the direct response method by grouping subjects into banks and then making them decide
sequentially. However, we did not nd a reliable way to devise such an experiment as it
seemed impossible to eliminate that subjects hypothesize on their position in the line by
considering when it was their turn to decide.
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institutions) , risk attitudes (using the Holt-Laury test, see Holt and Laury,
2002) cognitive skills (using a new set of the cognitive reection test, see
Frederick (2005) and Toplak et al. (2014)) and overcondence by asking the
subjects how many of the cognitive reection test questions they thought
to have answered correctly. When asking about their condence in di¤erent
institution we were especially interested in their attitude towards banks so
that we can control for it in our analysis. Possibly, some participants dis-
trust banks and that may make them more prone to withdraw and hence this
negative attitude may distort the analysis if we do not take it into account.
There was a 0-10 scale for family income and each point represented a range
of possible income. Condence in the di¤erent institutions was expressed on
a 0-10 scale as well.
Table 1 represents the averages and standard deviations of these variables
in each treatment. We see that the averages are close to each other in almost
all dimensions. In fact, statistical tests reveal that we cannot reject the hy-
potheses that the variables are equal in both treatments.15 This suggests that
subjects were appropriately randomized across treatments. When studying
pairwise correlations between these variables, we nd at the 5% signicance
level that males achieve higher Cognitive Reection Test (CRT) scores and
are also signicantly less overcondent than females. Older subjects (the
youngest / oldest participant was 18 /47 years old) tend to have less con-
dence in banks, whereas Economics and Business students trust more banks
than the rest of the participants. Higher CRT scores correlate signicantly
with lower overcondence. Even though we focus on the condence in banks,
we note for the sake of completeness that all the measures of condence in
the institutions except political parties were pairwise positively and signi-
cantly correlated. Unfortunately, most of the participants lled in the Holt
and Laury test in strange ways, that is swithching more than once or switch-
15For each variable we carried out a t-test. Additionally, for male and studies Econ&Bus
we performed a test of proportions, while for the rest of variables a Wilcoxon ranksum test.
In no case did we nd any signicant di¤erence at the conventional signicance levels.
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ing from the more risky lottery to the safer one. Seemingly, many subjects
(those who switched once, but started choosing the more risky option) mixed
up their choices. We have only 5 / 11 observations in the treatment without
/ with signaling that start choosing the less riky option and switch once to
the more risky one as its expected value increases su¢ ciently. These obser-
vations suggest that there are no di¤erences between the participants in the
di¤erent treatments. Since the number of observations is low we omit risk
aversion from the following analysis.16
Treatment without signaling Treatment with signaling
Male 45% (0.51) 48% (0.51)
Age 23.4 (7.2) 22.1 (3.3)
Risk aversion 3.4 (0.89) 3.5 (1.29)
Studies Econ&Business 30% (0.46) 18% (0.39)
Family income 4.3 (1.92) 4.8 (1.57)
Confidence in banks 3.06 (2.26) 3.36 (2.56)
CRT score 1.33 (1.27) 1.51 (1.18)
Overconfidence 1.57 (1.39) 1.42 (1.15)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. For all variables in each treatment we have 33 observations,
except risk aversion for which we have only 5 observations in the treatment without signaling and 11 in
the other one.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics
Each session lasted approximately one hour, and the subjects received on
average 10.64 / 11.8 Euros in the session without / with signaling, including
the show-up fee of 1 euro. For the payment, ECUs were transformed into
Euros using the exchange rate 10 ECUs = 1 Euro.
16Kiss et al. (2014) nd that risk aversion does not help to predict depositor decisions
in a similar experiment.
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4.2 Conjectures
Having in mind that the purpose of the paper is to see if the asymmetry in
the observability of previous decisions a¤ects the emergence of bank runs,
the main question is if we see a treatment e¤ect. That is, do we observe less
withdrawals and as a consequence less bank runs in the signaling treatment?
There are other conjectures based on the theoretical predictions. Namely,
in the signaling treatment we do not expect any withdrawals and therefore
no bank runs. Note that this prediction relies on the standard rationality
assumptions that each depositor is fully rational and believes that the others
are similar. Deviations from full rationality may lead to withdrawals, that is
why we collected data on cognitive skills. Since we used the strategy method,
we could not ask in a credible way about the beliefs that the participants
had about the choices of their co-players. Withdrawals may be due to the
belief that the other subjects do not understand the game and withdraw,
and then withdrawing early is a best response. That is why we are interested
in understanding the determinants of withdrawal in both treatments, but
especially in the signaling treatment. Another sharp theoretical prediction
is that participants in the signaling treatment should not use signaling, the
mere existence of this possibility should su¢ ce to wipe out bank runs.
In what follows we will investigate both individual decisions and aggregate
behavior. For the latter, we dene bank run in the most stringent way. There
is a bank run if there is at least one patient depositor who withdraws.
4.3 Results
We start with some descriptive statistics about individual decisions depicted
in Table 2. There are four information sets (observing nothing, 1, 2 or 3
withdrawals) that coincide in both treatments and allow direct comparison.
The corresponding decisions are represented in the rst four lines of Table 2.
Note that given the payo¤s, for the last two information sets patient depos-
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itors have a dominant strategy. Concretely, after observing two withdrawals
the dominant strategy is to withdraw (and earn 100, instead of 70). In a
similar vein, given the payo¤s and after observing 3 withdrawals it is domi-
nant strategy to wait (and earn 70 instead of 60). Hence, we are interested
in what happens in the information sets when nothing or when a withdrawal
is observed. These are key information sets to understand why bank runs
arise.
Observed decisions
Frequency of
withdrawals
Frequency of
waitings
Frequency of
withdrawals
Frequency of
waitings
Frequency
of signaling
Nothing 39.4% 60.6% 27.3% 42.4% 30.3%
1 withdrawal 60.6% 39.4% 39.4% 45.5% 15.2%
2 withdrawals 63.6% 36.4% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0%
3 withdrawals 24.2% 75.8% 24.2% 72.7% 3.0%
1 withdrawal, 1 signal - - 33.3% 57.6% 9.1%
1 withdrawal, 2 signals - - 9.1% 72.7% 18.2%
2 withdrawals, 1 signal - - 66.7% 27.3% 6.1%
1 signal - - 15.2% 45.5% 39.4%
2 signals - - 15.2% 66.7% 18.2%
Treatment without signaling Treatment with signaling
Table 2: Individual decisions in each possible information set in both treatments
In Table 2 we see that in both cases withdrawal rates are larger in the
treatment without signaling, suggesting that the asymmetry of observability
really a¤ects depositor decisions and the emergence of bank runs. If we test
the null hypothesis separately for the four shared information sets that with-
drawal rates are equal having as alternative hypothesis that withdrawal rates
in the treatment without signaling are higher, then the test of proportions
rejects this null hypothesis for the information set "observing a withdrawal"
(p-value=0.0424), but fails to reject the null hypothesis in the other cases.
The data suggests that as informed by the previous arguments about dom-
inant strategies, there is no di¤erence in the withdrawal rates when 2 or 3
withdrawals are observed and in the information set "observing nothing" we
fail to reject the null hypothesis in spite of a seemingly large di¤erence pos-
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sibly due to the low number of observations (33 in each treatment). Note
that dominant strategies imply that when 2 or 3 withdrawals are observed,
we should observe withdrawal rates of 100% and 0.17 The fact that we do
not see these numbers suggests that participants were not fully rational.
To calculate the likelihood of bank runs, we considered in both treat-
ments for all possible type vectors the probabilities that no patient depositor
withdraws and the complementary probability represents the frequency of
bank runs. For instance, examine the case when the rst depositor to decide
is impatient, followed by three patient depositors. When signaling is not
available, then the only way to avoid bank runs is when all of the patient
depositors wait. That is, the rst patient depositor (who in this type vector
is the second to decide, but does not know exactly her position) observes a
withdrawal and decides to wait (probability 39.4%). The next patient de-
positor (and also the last depositor) is also in the same situation, so she
observes a withdrawal and does not know her exact position. All of them
waiting when observing a withdrawal has probability 39:4%^3 = 6:11%, so
the probability of bank run is 93:89%. In the signaling case for the same
type vector we have to consider more cases as both waiting and signaling
are non-withdrawals. Thus, all three patient depositors waiting represents
a case without bank run, but also one / two / three of them signaling and
the rest waiting is also a case of no bank run. However, in these cases the
information sets of subsequent depositors changes. Note that considering all
possible type vectors is important as our theory is silent on who goes rst
to the bank.18 It is relevant to see how the probability of bank run changes
depending on the type vector as it may inform policy-making in the following
sense. If any of the type vectors (or sequences of decision) are more prone to
lead to bank runs, then decision-makers should strive to implement measures
17We can reject using t-test that the corresponding percentages are equal to 1 and 0,
respectively (p-values<0.004 in each case).
18There is no study in the bank run literature that investigates the issue of how the
sequence of decision is formed.
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that reduce the occurence of that type vector.
Table 3 represents the probabilities of bank run in both treatments for
all possible type vectors. In our case the type vector is determined by the
position of the impatient depositor. In the last two columns we report the
absolute and the relative decrease in the probability of bank runs.
Position of the
impatient depositor
Treatment
without signaling
Treatment with
signaling
Absolute
difference
Relative
difference
1 93.9% 70.7% -23.2% -24.7%
2 90.6% 69.9% -20.7% -22.9%
3 85.5% 60.5% -25.0% -29.3%
4 92.0% 54.2% -37.8% -41.1%
Probability of bank run
Table 3: The probability of bank run
Note that in each case the probability of bank runs is at least 20% smaller
in the treatment with signaling, the relative di¤erences being even larger
(as the occurence of bank runs is less than 100% in the treatment without
signaling). These sizable di¤erences also indicate that there is a treatment
e¤ect and bank runs are less likely to arise when signaling is available. In
the treatment with signaling the probability of bank run decreases with the
position of the impatient depositor. This is in line with results in Kiss et al.
(2014) who nd that observing withdrawals due to the impatient depositor
at the beginning of the sequence of decisions provokes more bank runs than
when the impatient depositor decides in latter positions. Overall, individual
decisions and aggregate behavior also suggest that there is a treatment e¤ect
and the incidence of withdrawals and bank runs is considerably lower in the
treatment with signaling.
Individual behavior in the shared information sets and the prevalence
of bank runs given the potential type vectors provide suggestive evidence
that the possibility of signaling reduces considerably the withdrawal rate
and consequently the emergence of bank runs. To understand better the
determinants of withdrawal we run probit and linear probability models both
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with and without individual characteristics gleaned from the questionnaire.
In all specications standard erros are clustered on the individual level.
Probit Probit Linear probability Linear probability
VARIABLES
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Obs. Nothing -0.205** -0.204** -0.242* -0.242*
(0.0978) (0.0972) (0.132) (0.133)
Obs. 1 withdrawal -0.0293 -0.0283 -0.0303 -0.0303
(0.105) (0.107) (0.112) (0.112)
Obs. 3 withdrawals -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.394*** -0.394***
(0.0662) (0.0651) (0.107) (0.108)
Treatment -0.600*** -0.628*** 0.0303 0.0263
(0.108) (0.100) (0.120) (0.122)
Obs. Nothing x Treatment 0.492*** 0.518*** -0.152 -0.152
(0.153) (0.145) (0.186) (0.187)
Obs. 1 withdrawal x Treatment 0.431*** 0.455*** -0.242 -0.242
(0.134) (0.132) (0.162) (0.164)
Obs. 2 withdrawals x Treatment 0.591*** 0.612*** (omitted) (omitted)
(0.0781) (0.0717)
Obs. 3 withdrawals x Treatment 0.574*** 0.591*** -0.0303 -0.0303
(0.0969) (0.0927) (0.152) (0.153)
Obs. 1 signal 0.118 0.146 -0.515*** -0.515***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.108) (0.109)
Obs. 2 signals 0.118 0.139 -0.515*** -0.515***
(0.148) (0.154) (0.108) (0.109)
Obs. 1 signal, 1 withdrawal 0.349** 0.379*** -0.333*** -0.333***
(0.138) (0.135) (0.104) (0.105)
Obs. 1 signal, 2 withdrawals 0.591*** 0.613*** -0 -0
(0.0767) (0.0696) (0.107) (0.108)
Obs. 2 signals, 1 withdrawal (omitted) (omitted) -0.576*** -0.576***
(0.0982) (0.0991)
Male 0.102 0.0892
(0.0665) (0.0595)
Age 8.78e-05 -0.000185
(0.00613) (0.00571)
Stud. Econ&Bus -0.0543 -0.0456
(0.0738) (0.0711)
Family income -0.0245 -0.0206
(0.0152) (0.0135)
Confidence in banks 0.0262** 0.0217**
(0.0112) (0.0102)
Cognitive Reflection Test -0.00801 -0.00597
(0.0380) (0.0344)
Overconfidence -0.00624 -0.00420
(0.0277) (0.0252)
Constant 0.636*** 0.651***
(0.0856) (0.178)
Observations 429 429 429 429
R-squared 0.171 0.193
Pseudo R-squared 0.135 0.156
Prob > chi2 0 5.23e-11
Prob > F 2.05e-09 7.93e-10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: The determinants of withdrawal - Probit and linear probability models
We choose as baseline the information set when two withdrawals are ob-
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served as for that case the withdrawal rates across treatments are almost
equal and there is no statistically signicant di¤erence between them. In
Table 4 we pool observations from both treatments and show regressions in
which the dependent variable is 1 if the subject decided to withdraw and is
zero otherwise. We use a treatment dummy (1 for the treatment with signal-
ing and 0 otherwise) and interaction terms to see if there is any treatment
e¤ect. Table 4 contains the marginal e¤ects of the variables.19
Both the probit and the linear probability model tell the same story. Com-
pared to the withdrawal rate when two withdrawals are observed, there are
signicantly less withdrawals when nothing / three withdrawals are observed.
Overall, we do not see a clear treatment e¤ect when considering the infor-
mation sets that coincide in both treatments. In the probit specications, if
we test if the coe¢ cient of the treatment dummy plus the coe¢ cient of the
interaction terms (e.g. -0.6+0.492 in the rst column for the case when noth-
ing is observed) is equal to zero, then we fail to reject these null hypotheses
at the 5% signicance level. If the 10% signicance level is considered, then
when a withdrawal is observed, the withdrawal rate in the treatment with
signaling is signicantly lower (p-values are 0.0876 / 0.0701 when individ-
ual characteristics are not / are taken into account) than in the treatment
without signaling. This is in line with the results of the previous statisti-
cal tests that also show signicant di¤erence at this information set. The
same tests fail to show any treatment e¤ect in the linear probability model.
Signicant di¤erences arise when we turn to the information sets that only
can occur in the treatment with signaling. For any information sets with
at least a signal and less than two withdrawals, the rate of withdrawal in
the treatment with signaling is signicantly di¤erent from the overall rate
in the treatment without signaling (p-value<0.015 in all cases in both pro-
bit and linear probability models).20 Depending on the exact information
19We did the same exercise using a logit model instead of the probit. The results are
almost identical.
20Note that when twi withdrawals and a signal are observed, then similarly to the case
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set, observing signal(s) decreases the probability of withdrawal by 33-58%,
ceteris paribus. All this suggests that the possibility of signaling had only
a moderate e¤ect through changing behavior in the coincident information
sets. Signaling helps more through creating information sets that contain
at least a visible signal. Adding individual characteristics does not change
coe¢ cients markedly in no case so they seem to have only a minor role in un-
derstanding withdrawal decisions. Hence, age, gender, studying Economics
or Business, family income, cognitive skills and overcondence do not appear
to be important. The only variable that a¤ects decisions is the condence in
the banks in an unexpected way. The higher the condence, the more likely
are subjects to withdraw.
If we consider the same regressions separately for the treatments (see
Table in Appendix A), the previous ndings are conrmed. Compared to
the baseline when two withdrawals are observed, in the treatment without
signaling in no specication do we see that the withdrawal rate is lower when
one withdrawal is observed, while in the treatment with signaling there is a
signicant di¤erence in all specications. Similarly to the previous results, in
the treatment with signaling for any information sets with at least a signal
and less than two withdrawals, the rate of withdrawal is signicantly lower
than in the baseline informaton set. Again, individual characteristics are not
signicant, except the condence in banks that increases the probability of
withdrawal.
We turn now to signaling. Remember that theory predicts that in the
signaling treatment patient depositors do not withdraw and nobody signals.
If we consider the condence intervals of signaling probabilities for the di¤er-
ent information sets, then we see that at the 95% the interval contains zero if
two withdrawals / three withdrawals / a signal and a withdrawal / a signal
and two withdrawals are observed. Hence, in these cases we cannot reject
when only two withdrawals are observed, the dominant strategy is to withdraw given the
payo¤s.
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the null hypothesis that the probability of signaling is zero. This result is
not surprising because when two withdrawals / three withdrawals / a signal
and two withdrawals are observed, then there is a dominant strategy. In
the other cases (that is if nothing / a withdrawal / a signal / two signals /
two signals and a withdrawal are observed), the probability of signaling is
positive.21 This clearly suggests that participants used signaling actively at
the beginning of the sequence of decision to "convince" subsequent patient
depositors not to withdraw. Using signals can be seen as an attempt to re-
duce strategic uncertainty (that is, uncertainty about the choice of the other
patient depositors, in our case, due to unobservability). Clearly, participants
used signaling too much, because when already two signals are observed, it
is unnecessary to signal. If we consider only the two participants that scored
the maximum four points in the cognitive reection test, then we observe
that they do not signal in any information set when it does not make sense.
This also hints at that many participants did not act as fully rational agents
in the experiment.
The rate of signaling is always less than the rate of waiting and the dif-
ference is signicant in all cases according to the test of proportions, except
when nothing / a signal is observed (p-values>0.3 in both cases). This nding
indicates that despite the extensive use of signaling it is still less frequently
chosen than waiting. In Appendix B we report the results of a multinomial
logit model in which the base category is waiting. That model only spots a
signicant di¤erence between waiting and signaling (the second being lower)
when two withdrawals are observed. The specications that include individ-
ual characteristics reveal that those who are older / have more condence
in banks, are less likely to signal than to wait, ceteris paribus. In sum,
individual decisions and bank run probabilities indicate that withdrawal is
considerably less frequent overall in the treatment with signaling. However,
21If we restrict our attention to the 99% condence intervals, then signaling remains
signicantly positive only when nothing / a signal is observed.
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contrary to the theoretical prediction we observe a high rate of signaling in
several information sets.
5 Conclusion
We claim that there is an asymmetry regarding what depositor decisions can
be observed: withdrawals can be more easily observed than decisions to keep
the money deposited in the bank. Previous theoretical results indicate that
if all previous decisions can be observed, then no bank run should happen in
equilibrium. Hence, we ask what occurs if give depositors the opportunity to
decrease the asymmetry present in observability. More concretely, we set up
a model in which withdawals are always observed, but depositors who keep
their funds deposited may make this decision visible (that is, signal), at a cost.
Theoretically, depositors without urgent liquidity needs should not withdraw
in this case, so bank run is eliminated as an equilibrium outcome. Moreover,
no signals should be observed, as the mere existence of the possibility of
signaling su¢ ces to wipe out bank runs.
We test these predictions in the lab. We nd suggestive evidence that
there is a treatment e¤ect. The probability of bank runs is markedly lower
when participants are able to signal their decisions to keep their money de-
posited. The di¤erence mainly does not come from the information sets that
are common in the two treatments, but it is due to the widespread use of
signaling. Signaling is e¤ective as once a signal is observed withdrawal rates
become low (except when two withdrawals are also observed apart from the
signal).
Based on the theoretical results and experimental ndings we may answer
the question posed in the title. Theoretically depositors would like to have
the opportunity to show others that they do not withdraw, but they would
never used the possibility. The experiment shows that depositors would not
only like to have the opportunity, but they would use it also extensively. We
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believe that these ndings indicate to banks and policy-makers that it would
be benecial to have ways that depositors could use as a signaling device,
similarly to our model. Potentially, it could decrease the incidence of bank
runs when there is no problem with the fundamentals.
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6 Appendix A
In this appendix we show probit and linear probability models similar to
those in Table 4, but here we show them separately for the teratments.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment
without signaling
Treatment
without signaling
Treatment
without signaling
Treatment without
signaling
Treatment with
signaling
Treatment with
signaling
Treatment with
signaling
Treatment with
signaling
Probit Probit Linear probability Linear probability Probit Probit Linear probability Linear probability
VARIABLES
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Marginal effects
reported
Obs. Nothing -0.236* -0.239* -0.242* -0.242* -0.271*** -0.269*** -0.394*** -0.394***
(0.123) (0.124) (0.132) (0.136) (0.0732) (0.0655) (0.132) (0.134)
Obs. 1 withdrawal -0.0316 -0.0304 -0.0303 -0.0303 -0.205*** -0.209*** -0.273** -0.273**
(0.115) (0.118) (0.112) (0.115) (0.0739) (0.0720) (0.119) (0.120)
Obs. 3 withdrawals -0.378*** -0.383*** -0.394*** -0.394*** -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.424*** -0.424***
(0.0932) (0.0936) (0.107) (0.110) (0.0555) (0.0504) (0.108) (0.110)
Obs. 1 signal -0.331*** -0.329*** -0.515*** -0.515***
(0.0474) (0.0412) (0.109) (0.111)
Obs. 2 signals -0.331*** -0.330*** -0.515*** -0.515***
(0.0436) (0.0390) (0.109) (0.111)
Obs. 1 signal, 1 withdrawal -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.333*** -0.333***
(0.0643) (0.0579) (0.105) (0.106)
Obs. 1 signal, 2 withdrawals 0 0.00260 -0 -0
(0.103) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109)
Obs. 2 signals, 1 withdrawal -0.360*** -0.362*** -0.576*** -0.576***
(0.0401) (0.0390) (0.0990) (0.100)
Male -0.0147 -0.0136 0.120 0.108
(0.105) (0.101) (0.0762) (0.0698)
Age -0.000143 1.16e-05 0.00261 0.00183
(0.00921) (0.00859) (0.00849) (0.00738)
Stud. Econ&Bus 0.0597 0.0501 -0.103 -0.0847
(0.119) (0.115) (0.0797) (0.0840)
Family income -0.0130 -0.0112 -0.0196 -0.0174
(0.0290) (0.0276) (0.0226) (0.0193)
Confidence in banks 0.0221 0.0196 0.0287*** 0.0237**
(0.0292) (0.0275) (0.0107) (0.00998)
Cognitive Reflection Test 0.0129 0.0142 -0.0159 -0.0140
(0.0545) (0.0513) (0.0420) (0.0375)
Overconfidence 0.0327 0.0315 -0.0310 -0.0262
(0.0421) (0.0392) (0.0359) (0.0316)
Constant 0.636*** 0.547** 0.667*** 0.652**
(0.0860) (0.245) (0.0845) (0.272)
Observations 132 132 132 132 297 297 297 297
R-squared 0.104 0.121 0.182 0.217
Pseudo R-squared 0.0777 0.0914 0.146 0.180
Prob > chi2 0.00434 0.0456 8.50e-09 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table Appendix A: The determinants of withdrawal - Probit and linear probability models for the treatments separately
7 Appendix B
In this appendix we show a multinomial logit model for the treatment with
signaling. We use the multinomial logit model as all the regressors are case-
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specic.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Withdrawal
Waiting -
benchmark Signaling Withdrawal
Waiting -
benchmark Signaling Withdrawal
Waiting -
benchma Signaling Withdrawal
Waiting -
benchmark Signaling
Obs. Nothing -1.336** 1.168 0.263** 3.214 -1.427*** 1.307 0.240*** 3.695
(0.536) (0.897) (0.141) (2.885) (0.552) (0.954) (0.133) (3.526)
Obs. 1 withdrawal -1.037* 0.406 0.355* 1.500 -1.095** 0.466 0.334** 1.593
(0.540) (0.893) (0.191) (1.340) (0.551) (0.925) (0.184) (1.474)
Obs. 2 withdrawals -0.201 -13.97*** 0.818 8.55e-07*** -0.196 -14.59*** 0.822 4.59e-07***
(0.504) (0.857) (0.412) (7.33e-07) (0.524) (0.867) (0.431) (3.98e-07)
Obs. 3 withdrawals -1.992*** -1.674 0.136*** 0.188 -2.076*** -1.658 0.125*** 0.190
(0.605) (1.316) (0.0825) (0.247) (0.615) (1.347) (0.0771) (0.257)
Obs. 1 signal -1.993*** 1.361 0.136*** 3.900 -2.114*** 1.551 0.121*** 4.718
(0.617) (0.945) (0.0842) (3.684) (0.651) (1.031) (0.0786) (4.864)
Obs. 2 signals -2.375*** 0.205 0.0930*** 1.227 -2.489*** 0.291 0.0830*** 1.338
(0.619) (0.978) (0.0575) (1.200) (0.632) (1.034) (0.0525) (1.384)
Obs. 1 signal, 1 withdrawal-1.440*** -0.342 0.237*** 0.711 -1.508*** -0.306 0.221*** 0.737
(0.464) (0.855) (0.110) (0.607) (0.486) (0.883) (0.108) (0.651)
Obs. 2 signals, 1 withdrawal-2.973*** 0.118 0.0511*** 1.125 -3.102*** 0.207 0.0449*** 1.231
(0.747) (0.829) (0.0382) (0.933) (0.744) (0.878) (0.0334) (1.081)
Male 0.590 -0.139 1.804 0.871
(0.427) (0.506) (0.771) (0.441)
Age -0.00864 -0.179** 0.991 0.836**
(0.0397) (0.0886) (0.0393) (0.0741)
Stud. Econ&Bus -0.377 0.712 0.686 2.038
(0.553) (0.645) (0.380) (1.313)
Family income -0.101 -0.0822 0.904 0.921
(0.103) (0.120) (0.0932) (0.110)
Confidence in banks 0.103* -0.191** 1.109* 0.826**
(0.0587) (0.0895) (0.0650) (0.0739)
Cognitive Reflection Test -0.0252 0.323 0.975 1.381
(0.235) (0.279) (0.229) (0.385)
Overconfidence -0.104 0.306 0.901 1.358
(0.209) (0.234) (0.188) (0.318)
Constant 0.894** -1.504* 2.444** 0.222* 1.225 2.209 3.405 9.111
(0.402) (0.794) (0.982) (0.176) (1.233) (2.286) (4.198) (20.83)
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
Pseudo R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multinomial logit Relative Risk Ratio Multinomial logit Relative Risk Ratio
40
